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Abstract: 
All around the world, the TV broadcasting business has had an enormous impact on the social, 
political and economic fields. Therefore, in general, most of the countries regulate TV business 
well to produce an optimal impact on the nation. In Indonesia, the TV broadcasting business is 
growing very significantly. After implementing Broadcasting Act number 32 of 2002, the number 
of TV broadcasting companies increased to 1,251 compared to before 2002, which only had 11 
channels, and were dominated by the private TV stations. However, the economic contribution of 
the TV broadcasting business in Indonesia is still small. Even in 2017, the number of TV 
companies decreased by 14.23% to 1,073. This situation raises a serious question: how exactly 
does Indonesian government policy regulate the TV industry? This article is the result of 
qualitative research that uses interviews and document analysis as a method of collecting data. 
The results showed that the TV broadcasting industry in Indonesia can not develop properly 
because the government do not apply fair rules to the private TV industry. Political interests still 
color the formulation of rules in which the government and big TV broadcasting companies apply 
the symbiotic mutualism policy to protect each other's interests.  
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Introduction  
At present, TV is an essential institution and has a significant influence on social, political 
and economic life for people in various countries around the world. Many researchers 
have published articles about this industry in international journals from multiple 
perspectives. Some investigate the issue from an economic point of view (Aman, 2013; 
Aman, Kasuga, & Moriyasu, 2018), others from economics and politics (Sudibyo & 
Patria, 2013), competition between TV media (Torii, 2017), organizations and business 
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models (Mütterlein & Kunz, 2018), and branding (Chan-Olmsted & Kim, 2001; Stipp, 
2012). Also, scholar analyzed from impact TV on politics (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; 
Esser et al., 2012; Gentzkow, 2006), media and social policy (Altheide, 1991), law and 
regulation (Ohlsson & Sjøvaag, 2018; Puppis, 2008), TV’s influence in a society from a 
sociological perspective (Mehraj, Bhat, & Mehraj, 2014), as well as a number of 
psychological influences (Overstreet et al., 2017; Rider et al., 2016). All these 
publications acknowledge that TV is an essential institution that has a significant 
influence on society in many dimensions. Unfortunately, TV publications that use a 
combination of politics and economic perspectives are rarely carried out.  
In almost all countries, the TV industry has had a tremendous economic impact. 
Television is a creative industry that makes a direct and indirect economic contribution 
to the economy (Koshpasharin & Yasue, 2014). Its direct economy contribution occurs 
in the form of gross output and added value  derived from capital and labor related to 
industry activities, including labor, TV program production, and taxes. Meanwhile, the 
indirect contribution is in the values of events that occur in other sectors and on other 
stages that constitute the industry chain; for example, the businesses of supplying goods 
and services to the TV industry. 
As the fifth most populous country in the world, in 2010 the Indonesian TV industry made 
an economic contribution of 17,001 billion Rupiahs (US$ 1.24 million), consisting of the 
direct financial contribution of 5,246 billion Rupiahs (US$ 185 thousand), and an indirect 
economic contribution of 6.789 billion Rupiahs (US$ 493 thousand), and induced 4,966 
billion Rupiahs (US$ 361 thousand). Furthermore, TV business activities also include 
344,300 jobs and generate government tax revenues for the government amounting to 
1,769 billion Rupiahs (the US$ 128 thousand) (Oxford Economics, 2012). 
Although this seems impressive, the contribution of TV to the economy in Indonesia is 
still below that in China, India, and the USA. China - the most populous country in the 
world- has a TV industry which made a total economic contribution of 150 billion Yuan 
or the US$ 21.8 million, giving tax of 39 billion Yuan (the US$ 5.7 billion) and supporting 
1,240 million jobs (Oxford Economics, 2015). In India, the second most populous country 
in the world, TV industry amounted to US$ 11.681 million, with taxes totaling US$ 1.623 
million, and was able to support 16.44 million jobs (Deloitte, 2017). 
Meanwhile, the USA is the country that receives the greatest economic contribution from 
TV, amounting to US$ 733.50 billion  (Woods & Poole Economics, 2015), paying US$ 
19.9 billion in taxes, and supporting 468.56 million jobs (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 
2017). The combined total economic contribution of TV in China, India, and Indonesia 
remains less than that made by the TV industry in the USA. 
Many researchers designate that the TV industry is playing a strategic position because 
these media have immense social and political influence in society (Altheide, 1991; 
Besley, 2006; Holbert, 2005; Jenssen, 2009; Newton, 2016; Nielsen, Fletcher, Sehl, & 
Levy, 2018; Sørensen, 2016). Therefore, various countries around the world, including 
Indonesia are paying prominent attention to the TV industry, by the application of the 
Broadcasting Act, government regulations, and the establishment of the Indonesia 
Broadcasting Commission that supervise TV broadcasting. 
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The high economic prospect and the strategic influence of TV media in social and 
political fields make the government of Indonesia come into a dilemma situation. On the 
one hand, the government has to develop TV industry to provide a higher economic 
contribution and, on the other hand, they have to create political stability by maintaining 
TV channels do not make noisy and using TV media to mobilize public support and 
opinion. This situation makes the government tend to apply ambiguous policies in the TV 
industry. The system made some TV business were felt to obtain business support, but 
others were in severe, even went bankruptcy. In 2017 the number of TV companies 
decreased by 14.23% to 1,073 after a dramatic increase from 11 companies in the New 
Order era, to 1,251 in the Reformation era since the Broadcasting Act of 32 of 2002 has 
been applied. This phenomenon raises serious questions: how does the Indonesia 
government policy in the TV industry? 
Methodology  
This article is a study of government regulations on the TV industry, using a qualitative 
method based on a political economy perspective. The focus and material incorporated 
into the study are regulations related to the TV business and tracking of the background 
of the policy. Therefore, the researchers used interviews and literature studies. The 
interview is a precious method to get data about interviewee's perceptions, knowledge, 
and experience and can encourage data profound (Ryan, Coughlan, & Cronin, 2016). 
Interviews were conducted to the top managers of TV company and senior commissioners 
of broadcasting, using unstructured interview techniques. The technique allows 
interviewees to express their ways and pace, with a minimum hold on respondents' 
responses (Corbin, Morse, & Morse, 2003). Also, to get the information of TV business, 
researchers obtained data in the form of documents of the Broadcasting Act and the 
government regulations related to the TV business. 
 
Furthermore, researchers have analysed the data using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (Smith, 2011) which interprets phenomena based on individual experience with 
logical explanations and links them to empirical evidence. Analysis of other Acts and 
regulations are carried out in an interdisciplinary analysis because examining rules is 
inherently interdisciplinary (Losoncz, 2017). In interpreting the regulations, the authors 
use a critical-realist approach (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002), 
investigating the data analytically using relativity from a perspective of reality (Losoncz, 
2017).  
Literature Review  
A regulation that regulates and influences human behaviour, including business, never 
occurs in the based on a single mechanism (Woolcock, Braithwaite, & Drahos, 2001). 
Various aspects, in the social, political and economic fields, will influence the creation of 
regulations. Moreover, a rule will reflect the context of values and culture in the existence 
when the law is made (Losoncz, 2017), besides being influenced by interest groups 
(Grossmann, 2012). Therefore, a law can change according to the circumstances and 
interests of the community. Changes in the socio-political and economic systems can 
fundamentally shift the direction of a regulation, even if they regulate the same problem.  
Like other businesses, TV requires many regulations. Every country in all political 
systems regulates the field of this creative industry. The state controls this field because 
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TV is a business that uses limited natural resources in the form of radio frequencies 
(Herter, 1985; Strużak, Tjelta, & Borrego, 2016). The radio frequency signal is a vehicle 
where broadcasters use to enable TV shows to reach the audiences' receivers. Because 
these frequencies are limited, not everyone can have a license, and the state regulates who 
is eligible to obtain one (Corbett, 1996; Musey, 2012). Generally, countries design 
regulations that benefit all parties according to their domestic needs (Baasanjav, 2016). 
The law will change if situations, conditions, political interests, and local needs change. 
According to Robert G. Picard (2016), politics tends to hover and is often changing. In 
politics, nothing is constant, except for sense of a continual concern.  
 
Also, business rules generally are influenced by interest groups (Grossmann, 2012). An 
interest groups can be groups of individuals or organizations that intend to influence 
government policies to support their interests (Andreas & Bievre, 2014; Beyers, Eising, 
& Maloney, 2009). They influence in several ways, including pressing the government 
and influencing the public to have perceptions and desires in the same as their interests 
(Richardson, 2000). Research shows that lobbying using advocacy groups, for example, 
is very common in various countries to fight for interests (Lucas, Hanegraaff, & De 
Bruycker, 2019). 
 
Generally, there are two models of TV licensing, namely the private and the public 
models (Sudibyo, 2004). The first model argues that the radio frequency is a limited 
natural resource, so it must be public, and the public is represented by the state. The state 
gives the broadcaster the right to use it based on public interest, with a licensing 
mechanism that must be democratic. Only broadcasters who have the necessary 
professional capability are entitled to access radio frequencies. If the broadcaster fails to 
carry out their professionalism duties, they must return the license to the state. 
 
Unlike the first model, the second model proposes that radio frequency can be held as 
private property, through a market transactions process. Television broadcasters do not 
have an obligation to submit to public interests, except to obtain profits. The government, 
as an intermediary, acts to regulate the competition for this license (Corbett, 1996). The 
market will select on the basis of broadcasters’ ability to manage the frequency. 
 
TV stations that broadcast free to air will distribute to people who freely subscribe. 
Because it is direct contact with the audience, the state and broadcasting commission 
regulate the business. These regulations will be different in each country, according to 
the needs and wants of the country. The rules in the USA and Thailand, for example, will 
different from those rules in Indonesia, even though all these nations use a democratic 
system of government. In normative terms, a TV broadcaster has the moral responsibility 
not to harm the audience. Even so, in reality, TV broadcasters are more concerned with 
the political and business interests than with the interests of society. The broadcasting 
arrangement will have a broad impact, on the social, political, and economic aspects. 
Discussion  
Articles regarding Indonesian TV broadcasting in international publications are rare. 
Among the few papers are written by Sudibyo (2004); Sudibyo and Patria (2013); 
Armando (2014); Rahayu (2016); Putra, Djuyandi, and Mani (2017); Widyatama (2017, 
2018b, 2018a, 2018c), dan Myutel (2019). None of those articles discusses how 
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Indonesian government policies affect TV broadcasting, especially the report which is 
using the combination of the perspective of law, politics, and economics altogether. Other 
publications have been written in Indonesian, most of them focusing on the content and  
effect of TV. 
 
Since the start of TV broadcasting in 1962, the Indonesian government has adopted 
several different regulatory systems (Widyatama, 2018b). In the Old Order regime, the 
elite implemented a monopoly system, which only allowed one TV station, namely 
Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI). The government used TVRI as a medium of power 
and tool to build the spirit of national unity. In the New Order regime up to 1997, the 
government continued to implement a monopoly in the TV broadcasting system. 
However, in 1989 the government changed the regulations, allowing the private, 
commercial TV to operate. In 1989, the government approved five commercial TV 
stations, namely RCTI, SCTV, Indosiar, AN TV, and TPI. All licenses were given to the 
families of President Soeharto and his business and political cronies.  
 
The licensing of such TV broadcasts shows that Soeharto used kinship and crony politics 
in the television business to have power dominance. Kinship politics is used by the 
authorities to maintain domination and control political stability (Collins, 2004; Eklof, 
2004; Tusalem, 2015). Soeharto was aware that TV broadcasts had a strategic position 
affecting political stability. Political stability has a significant influence on development  
(Dalyop, 2019). TV broadcast media can significantly help reducing poverty (Kenny & 
Eltzroth, 2003). Despite the emergence of private TV establishments, the broadcasting 
system was still centralized, and broadcast from a Jakarta perspective. The desire to 
control TV was increasingly apparent from the government's decision to issue Law 
number 24 of 1994 that all TV stations must be located in Jakarta. In the New Order Era, 
political reasons still dominated the granting of TV licenses.  
 
The government control over TV media, as occurred in Indonesia, is a global trend. 
Larreguy & Marshall (2019) mentions that several countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and Latin America control the media. The control over TV media also happens 
in Arab countries as revealed by Zaid (2018) who examined 11 countries, comprising of 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, and Tunisia. The control in these countries has a similar fundamental goal to 
secure the power of the ruling elite. The tendency to control the media occur in all political 
systems of government (Walker, Orttung, Walker, & Orttung, 2014). 
 
On May 1998, Indonesia experienced a severe crisis that lead to a change of government 
(Ho and Yeh, 2014), from the New Order to the Reformation Era. Between 2000 and 
2002, the government gave five private TV licenses, namely Metro TV, TV One 
(formerly named Lativi), Trans TV, TV 7 (later changed to Trans 7), and Global TV. The 
licensee consists of businessmen and media conglomerates, in addition to politicians and 
religious organizations. The spirit of reformation makes the licensing more accessible and 
all-inclusive.   
 
The 1998 economic crisis brings TV media ownership changes. Many TV station owners 
sell their companies to pay off corporate debts. Harry Tanoesudibyo (media conglomerate 
and politician) take control TPI (changed the name into MNCTV), RCTI, and Global TV; 
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Chairul Tanjung (businessman) acquired TV 7 (then renamed Trans 7), while Aburizal 
Bakrie (conglomerate and politician) bought Lativi TV and changed its name to TV One. 
 
In 2002, the government changed the system of TV broadcasting from a centralized to a 
decentralized method, by implementing the Act of 32 on Broadcasting. It was stated by 
HP (37) KPID’s commissioner that the Act has a reformation spirit of fostering diversity 
of ownership and diversity of content, such as dialogue 1 (personal communication, 
November 3, 2018): 
 
*Dialogue 1 
Researcher : Apa sebenarnya tujuan pemerintah menerbitkan UU 
Penyiaran? [What is the purpose of the government in issuing the Act of 
Broadcasting?] 
KPID’s Commissioner (1): Tujuan pemerintah menerbitkan UU Penyiaran 
sebenarnya baik, yaitu mewujudkan semangat reformasi berupa menumbuhkan 
keberagaman kepemilikan media dan keberagaman isi media agar demokrasi 
Indonesia lebih sehat. [The aim of the government to issue the Act of 
Broadcasting is excellent, which is to realize the spirit of reform in the form of 
increasing diversity of media ownership and diversity of media content so that 
Indonesian democracy is salutary.] 
 
Centralized method is considered not to benefit the regions, both economically and 
politically. Indonesia is a vast country consisting of various tribes and languages (1,340 
ethnicities and 2,500 languages) (Na’im & Syaputra, 2010), spreading over 2,342 islands 
from 17,504 Indonesia archipelagos. Also, excessive accumulation of media ownership 
has the potential to undermine pluralism (Costa e Silva, 2015). 
 
The fall of the New Order regime brings Indonesian to political freedom (Zarkasyi, 2008) 
and the private TV was freed from the obligation to relay TVRI broadcasts. All TV 
stations can produce a news program, including political reports. However, this news 
tends are detected not to be objective and takes a side, because the owners have coloured 
the journalism content according to their business and political interests, in order to get 
access to political power and voters’ support. Some TV company’s owners are involved 
in political parties, even some of them set up political organizations, for instance, Harry 
Tanoesudibyo founded the Perindo Party, and Surya Paloh founded the Nasdem Party. 
Some TV channel becomes partisan. Metro TV tends to support the government while 
TV One supports the opponent (Putra, Djuyandi, & Mani, 2017). Later, Metro TV's 
partiality to the government has been following by RCTI, MNC TV, and Global TV. 
 
The Broadcasting Act of 2002 requires all TV stations to broadcast locally. Hence, the 
national TV has to release TV relay stations' ownership in the regions. These provisions 
inspire people to make local TV stations. The TV companies increased dramatically to 
1.251 from 11 companies. The increase of new TV stations is generally dominated by 
private TV stations that broadcast free-to-air. However, most of the local private TV 
stations are subsidiaries of national TV stations from Jakarta. The local private television 
has initially been a national TV relay station. Among the new local private TV stations, 
the independent TV stations (not TV broadcasting subsidiaries from Jakarta, nor a 
member of TV stations) only amount to less than 1%. The TV channel that established 
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before 2002 subsequently referred to as 'national TV' or 'Jakarta TV', while TV companies 
that were built after 2002 were called local TVs. Generally, independent local TV stations 
are small TV broadcasting companies, less capital, inadequate facilities, and a limited 
number of human resources. 
 
The obligation to cut assets off in the regions as stipulated by the Broadcasting Act is 
burdensome for national TV companies. SP (50) the commissioner of the Indonesian 
Broadcasting Commission Region of Yogyakarta member as reflected in the dialogue 2 
explained this (personal communication, November 10, 2018): 
 
*Dialogue 2. 
Researcher : Mengapa TV nasional keberatan terhadap pelepasan asset? 
[Why the national TV companies opposed to release their assets?] 
KPID’s Commissioner (2): Untuk melepaskan aset bukan masalah sederhana 
tetapi membutuhkan banyak pertimbangan, baik manajemen, hukum, 
administrasi, dan bisnis. Kebijakan itu tidak mudah diterapkan karena mereka 
adalah perusahaan besar yang telah go-public; sehingga akan melibatkan 
banyak pihak, misalnya pemegang saham, mitra, pemasok, karyawan, dan 
sebagainya. Itu butuh waktu lama. Mereka juga telah menghabiskan banyak 
modal untuk aset ini. Karena itu, mereka tentu keberatan untuk melepaskan 
asetnya. [Releasing the assets is not just a simple problem but it takes a lot of 
consideration dealing with the management, law, administration, and business. 
The policy is not easy to implement since they are big companies, which do go 
public cooperation; hence, it will involve many parties, such as shareholders, 
partners, suppliers, employees, etc. This process obviously took a lot of time. 
Besides, they have spent a lot of capital on these assets. Therefore, they certainly 
object to release their assets.] 
 
The national TV broadcaster attempt several efforts to urge the government to change the 
Broadcasting Act. They acted as an interest group by influencing the public to refuse the 
Broadcasting Act through their broadcasting. The national TV owners have strong 
lobbying capabilities in parliament and they registering an objection to the Constitutional 
Court of several provisions of the Broadcasting Act (Riyanto et al., 2012).  
 
After a severe hearing, the Constitutional Court decided to consent a part of prosecuting, 
namely revoking KPI's authority in granting and revoking TV licenses. The 
Constitutional Court's decision made the regime issues  government regulations (PP) on 
TV stations that regulated different TV categories. There were four government 
regulations, consist of PP number 11 of 2005 concerning public TV; PP number 50 of 
2005 on private TV; PP number 51 of 2005 on community TV; and PP number 52 of 
2005 on subscribe TV. Public TV is owned and funded by the state and is non-profit 
oriented. Indonesia only has one public TV, that is Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI). 
Commercial TV is owned by private sector-oriented to profit from advertising revenue. 
Paid-TV is privately owned and aimed to promote advertising and audience subscriptions. 
Community TV is a non-profit oriented community-owned TV and funded by the 
community. The government regulation was issued during the administration of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who served two periods, namely the period 2004-2009 and 
2009-2014.  
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The government has not changed many regulations on public TV, except the form of 
organization and its position, which is more independent of the government. Through this 
regulation, public TV organizations are transformed into Public Broadcasting Institutions 
(LPP), which are led by a board of directors and overseen by the Supervisory Board. Both 
are selected by the government together with the Parliament through open recruitment. 
The Board of Trustees functions to represent the public, government, and public 
broadcasting organisations. The state finances LPP, but still allows LPP to accept 
advertisements because the state budget is still limited. From the aspect of its position on 
the government, according to PP number 11 of 2005, it is independent. However, the 
influence of the government is still there, although a little. 
 
After the PP number 11 of 2005 implemented, TVRI still faces several challenges. The 
government funds are limited, but the number of employees is enormous, so finance is 
absorbed into employee salaries. The majority of employees are civil servants who are 
used to working in an old culture that is taboo against the government and lacks initiative. 
Also, most TVRI equipment is old. Externally, the government still influences TVRI's 
policies, albeit slightly. All these problems made TVRI broadcasts not varied, and the 
public even consider TVRI's image as a mouthpiece of the government. As a result, TVRI 
has fewer viewers than national private TV does.  
 
Based on the PP number 50 of 2002 on private TV station, the government gave a 
different treatment between national private TV and local TV. According to regulation, 
local TV stations have to broadcast not more than 75% of the provincial territory of 
Indonesia, while national TV stations are free to transmit across 90% of the Indonesian 
provinces. The differences in regulations regarding the broadcast coverage areas create 
injustice between the national private TV and the local private TV. This issue was stated 
by WS (52), one of the local TV managers at Yogyakarta Province, as reflected in the 
dialogue 3 (personal communication, October 9, 2018): 
 
*Dialogue 3. 
Researcher : Apa pendapat Anda atas peraturan menteri tersebut? [What is 
your opinion regarding to the ministry regulation?] 
Local TV manager (1) : Peraturan ini cenderung tidak fair. Semestinya 
pemeritnah membantu TV lokal dibanding TV nasional yang sudah memiliki 
modal dan infrastruktur yang kuat. [This regulation tends to be unfair. The 
government should give their support the local TV instead of the national TV that 
already has strong capital and infrastructure.] 
 
The difference in broadcast coverage has made national TV more attractive as a 
commercial medium for advertisers than local TV. National private TV has  an 
opportunity to get more advertising than independent local TV does. As a result, there is 
a wide gap in advertising revenue. National TV receives more advertising income than 
local TV does. The further impact is that the national TV gets a greater opportunity to 
finance broadcasts and produce more varied broadcast material than the local TV does. 
 
The researcher analyses that the reason for the government's partiality towards the big 
national TV station is because of the mutually beneficial consideration between the two. 
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The relationship between government and broadcasting TV stations is viewed as   
symbiotic mutualism. On the one hand, TV stations need government support in the form 
of rules that benefit their business. The national TV station owners prefer the old 
broadcasting system where they can broadcast nationally and are not subject to 
restrictions on ownership of the TV broadcasting companies. On the other hand, the 
government needs the support of the TV stations to create national political stability, in 
addition to building a positive image, public opinion, and political support of the public. 
The government is no longer enough to use its TVRI public TV station to achieve its 
political goals, because people have a perception that TVRI is a mouthpiece of the 
government that often covers up real information. 
 
In the reform era, Indonesia's political system has changed significantly, following the 
dissatisfaction with the New Order which was in power previously. The government is 
no longer easy to get public support in all parts of Indonesia without the help of the 
national TV. In this era, the broadcasting system was changed to decentralized. Political 
communication must involve many local stations to reach the national territory, which 
requires more time and cost, so it is inefficient. In the previous era, the government did 
not face such obstacles because it could mobilize national TV stations with political 
coercion. In the reform era, political interests tend to run through transactional politics. 
The government needs efficient political communication, and the national TV stations 
can meet these needs. Meanwhile, the large TV stations need favourable regulations, 
where the government can meet these regulations. 
 
Despite sharp criticism from owners of small TV stations and academics, the issuance of 
PP number 50 in 2005 went without a hitch. The government still does not change this 
provision. After all, not all local TV station owners protested the regulation. Many local 
TV stations are subsidiaries of national TV stations from Jakarta. Besides, the owners of 
the large TV stations support the regulation, because after their aspirations. The national 
TV has benefited from these situations; hence, they provide political support to the 
government. 
 
The issuance of the PP number 50 on private TV stations raises severe problems for local 
private TV stations. Because the broadcast range is more limited than national TV, 
advertisers prefer to advertise on national TV stations. The small amount of advertising 
revenue makes local TV facing many problems. Surokim and Wahyudi (2013) wrote, on 
average local TV is only able to finance 40% of operational costs. They cannot pay 
employees satisfactorily, cannot produce enough TV programs and have not to produce 
attractive programs. Local TV often re-broadcasts material so that their broadcasts are 
monotonous and do not interest the audience. They are only able to capture 10% of the 
local audience (Surokim and Wahyudi, 2013). The situations are complicated and 
challenging to local TV as mention by S (54) a local TV manager. It was reflected in the 
dialogue 4 (personal communication, October 10, 2018). 
 
*Dialogue 4. 
Researcher : Apa dampak perbedaan aturan bagi TV local dan apa yang 
dilakukan TV lokal? [What is the impact of the different broadcasting regulation 
for local tv and what have they done?] 
  
10 
 
Local TV manager (2) : Tingginya biaya operasional membuat banyak 
perusahaan TV lokal tidak dapat menjalankan bisnisnya dengan baik dan 
banyak lainnya yang bangkrut. Banyak TV lokal telah menjual saham mereka 
kepada pemilik TV nasional atau menjadi bagian dari stasiun jaringan TV yang 
dipimpin oleh perusahaan TV nasional. Pilihan paling menguntungkan untuk TV 
lokal adalah bergabung sebagai anggota jaringan siaran TV dengan TV 
nasional. [The high operational costs have made many local TV companies 
unable to run their business well, and many others were bankrupt. Many of TV 
local have sold their shares to national TV owners or become part of the TV 
networking stations led by the national TV companies. The most advantageous 
choice for local TV is joining as a member of the TV broadcast network with 
national TV.]  
 
The Communication and Information Ministry reports that in 2017 the number of local 
TV stations decreased by 14.23% compared to 2016, falling to a total of 1,073 companies. 
Most of Indonesia TV stations are small companies (Nainggolan, 2018).    
 
In share ownership, the government regulation also regulates differently between national 
TV and local TV. According to rule, local TV owners are allowed to have at most 2 TV 
broadcasting licenses in 2 different provinces; the owner can hold 100% of the shares in 
the first broadcasting company, but a maximum of 49% of the shares in the second 
company. If he/she has a third TV station, then he/she cannot own more than 20% of the 
shares in the company. For a fourth company and so on, this maximum falls to 5% of the 
shares. Unfortunately, the rules do not cover national TV companies who have the 
privilege of controlling 90% of shares in the second company and 49% of shares in the 
3rd, 4th and so on. The regulation makes national TV channels have more asset than local 
TV does. 
 
Recently, local TV was unable to press the government to remove the discriminatory 
rules. The owners of big stations have powerful political relations with the ruling elite. 
Surya Paloh (owner of Metro TV), is a Golkar party politician who is a party supporting 
the government. At present, Surya Paloh is still the government supporter, through the 
party he founded: Nasdem Party. Likewise, the owner of the largest network in Indonesia, 
Harry Tanoesudibyo. Harry, who owns RCTI, MNC TV, Global TV, and iNews stations, 
is a prominent businessperson and founder of the Perindo Party who has always supported 
the government until now. At present, Perindo Party is one of the seven significant parties 
in Indonesia and is a ruling support party. 
 
Meanwhile, Aburizal Bakrie (owner of TV One and ANTV), is a former Golkar Party 
chair and former minister of economic coordinator in the era of President Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The only owner of a large TV station who is not a politician is 
Chairul Tanjung, who owns Trans TV and Trans 7. He is an accomplished businessman 
and lobbyist. He has extensive relations among business people, politicians, and 
government officials. Because of his abilities, he has held three ministerial positions, 
namely the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, the Minister of Forestry, and the 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources in the era of President Soesilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono's administration. 
 
  
11 
 
The strong relationship between the large national TV stations and the government makes 
it difficult for independent local TV stations to ask for more equitable arrangements in 
the TV broadcasting business. The local TV channel manager, WS (52), expresses his 
grumble as reflect in dialogue 5 (personal communication, October 9, 2018). 
 
*Dialogue 5. 
Researcher : Tidakkah TV lokal menginginkan peraturan yang lebih adil? 
[Don't local TV want fairer regulations?] 
Local TV manager (1) : Ya, tentu saja kami ingin peraturan yang lebih adil. Tapi 
itu sulit. [Yes, of course we want fairer regulations, even though it seems so 
difficult to get.]  
Researcher : Kenapa? [Why?] 
Local TV manager (1) : Upaya kami memaksa pemerintah merevisi peraturan 
tentang penyiaran TV agar lebih fair, membutuhkan banyak sumber daya. 
Secara umum, TV lokal tidak memiliki sumber daya yang memadai selain 
keterbatasan jaringan politik. [Our efforts in order to force the government to 
revise a fairness regulation on TV broadcasting require so many resources. In 
this case, generally, the local TV does not have adequate resources besides the 
limitations of political networks.] 
 
The differentiation of broadcasting regulations in Indonesia makes local TV undeveloped 
well. The independent local TV is not well organized as national private TV to express 
their interests. As a result, the national TV still dominates in the air of Indonesian 
television. Whereas the government hopes all TV stations contribute to economic and 
national development, as well as promote national unity and integration, and providing 
public space to foster democracy. In 2015, Indonesia’s TV industry contributed $4.9 
billion, and the following year increased to 11% of $5.4 (MarketLine, 2017). The 
contribution was increasing from US$ 1.24 million in 2010. The government hopes in the 
coming years the TV broadcasting contributions are continuously increasing. Indonesia 
is a potential market for the TV broadcasting industry because Indonesia is a populous 
country, that has a population over 258.71 million (Biro Pusat Statistik, 2017) and the 
number of households that have owned TV sets reaches 87.7% of the population. 
 
The author analyzes that the government's expectation will be challenging to achieve if 
the regulation of the private TV broadcasting is still unfair. In the settings of the public 
TV, subscription TV, and community TV so far it has been good regulated. The 
government funded and managed public TV independently. The community TV is 
community funded, serves the society, independent, and not commercially purposed. The 
paid-TV is commercial, funded by advertisements and subscriptions. The government 
must change the broadcasting rules more equitably for all private TV. Fair TV 
broadcasting regulations are needed so that the local TV stations could develop their self 
healthier and stronger. Also, they could contribute to economic and social more 
significant. The appropriate TV broadcasting rules for the private TV have to be 
reformulated by the government by involving all shareholders based on the spirit of 
national broadcasting as formulated in the Broadcasting Act number 32 of 2002. 
 
Actually, the situation of inequality between national and local TV stations in Indonesia 
also occurs in other countries, even in developed countries. In America, for instance, local 
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TV reporters and TV editors are less than on national TV because of the costs and limited 
resources (Lee, Long, Slater, & Song, 2014). However, cases of inequality that occur in 
America are likely to be related to financial and management capabilities. National TV 
stations tend to have more resources than local TV stations do  (Lee et al., 2014; 
Wallington, Viswanath, & Blake, 2010). Broadcast policy researchers advise the national 
TV should have more obligations than the local TV should, because they have had the 
opportunity to get more advertisements (Salomon, 2016). 
 
The unjust regulation of private TV in Indonesia does not provide advantages to the 
people, especially in the purpose of fostering diversity of content, although the 
government has implemented the Broadcasting Act for more than a decade. This situation 
also affected the economic contribution of the television business. The most significant 
contribution of TV broadcasting still relies on national TV, which has developed into a 
giant TV broadcasting that has stronger capital (Nainggolan, 2018).  
Conclusion  
In general, the Indonesian government applies regulations for the public TV, private TV, 
subscription TV, and community TV differently. The rules of the public TV, subscription 
TV, and community TV, generally are well regulated. However, the private TV 
regulations tend to be unjust. The Indonesian government tends to apply different rule 
and treatment in private TV business. The more favourable treatment is given to the 
national TV company than to the local TV. This situation makes local TV companies are 
not developed properly. Differences in regulations make the national TV business 
opportunities more secure than the local TV. They have a broader range of broadcasts; 
therefore, get more viewers, so they are more attractive to advertisers than local TV. As 
a result, the national TV advertising revenue is more significant than local TV, hence they 
more developing while other TV companies remaining have many problems, even some 
local TVs are shut their operations down or bankruptcy. In the effort of avoiding 
bankruptcy, some local TVs are choosing to be part of TV broadcast networks under 
national TV broadcasting.  
 
The application of different regulations in broadcasting proves that the state is ambivalent 
(Thomas, 2014). The issuance of discriminatory government regulation of 50 of 2005 
confirms that the government pay more attention to political and business compromise 
than the original purpose of Act of 32 of 2002. That compromise proves that patron-client 
practices in the New Order regime are continuing in the Reformation Era. 
 
The arrangement of regulations in the TV industry does not occur in a single simple 
mechanism (Woolcock et al., 2001). Many interested parties in this industry, influence 
the contents of the regulation. The owner of a national TV company is the most dominates 
party in determining of TV regulations in Indonesia. They have great resources to become 
a pressure group, hence that the arrangements tent to protect their interests, especially in 
the share ownership and broadcasts coverage while the local TV stations owner are 
generally small firms that do not have powerful resources to fight for their interests. 
 
The owners of national TV have higher power because most of them also become 
politicians. They can influence the contents of TV regulations in debates in parliament 
and pressure the government. On the other hand, they also found the same interests as the 
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ruling elite who needed political communication media in the form of television channels 
to get popular support. 
 
Regulations that are more beneficial for national TV firms make the economic 
contribution of this business sector still rely on national TV. Laws and government 
regulations regarding TV broadcasting must be changed consistently in realizing the spirit 
of TV broadcasting reform, namely to realize the diversity of ownership and 
diversification of content. These consistent regulations are believed to develop local TV 
companies better so that the local economy increasing, and in turn, raising economic TV 
contribution in Indonesia. 
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